Below Giorgia Meloni, whose get together, Brothers of Italy, descends from the post-fascist Nationwide Alliance and the neo-fascist Italian Social Motion, migration stays a cornerstone of coverage.
The Italian authorities’s new invoice, handed earlier in February and aligning with the EU’s current regulatory framework, seeks to relaunch the so-called ‘Albania mannequin‘, by which sure reception and repatriation measures are outsourced to non-EU states.
Nonetheless, even leaving apart moral and authorized issues, and seen purely from the angle of deterrence, there are important doubts concerning the measures’ effectiveness.
Returns to Italy stay stubbornly low and nicely beneath pre-pandemic averages, elevating questions on whether or not the invoice will obtain its acknowledged targets.
And, as soon as once more, migration coverage seems anchored in a politics of irreality, extra centered on optics than on sustainable, long-term technique.
A naval blockade in title solely
The invoice centres on deterrence and decreasing arrivals.
One among its most debated measures is the so-called “naval blockade”, a provision as expensive to the federal government because the Albania mannequin and equally contested.
In follow, nonetheless, it isn’t a naval blockade, as no navy intervention is concerned.
The federal government can briefly bar sure ships, primarily NGO vessels, which in accordance with Ministry of Inside knowledge account for less than about 12 p.c of arrivals, from coming into Italian waters for 30 days, extendable as much as six months, in periods of outstanding migratory strain, safety threats, public well being emergencies, or main occasions.
The laws additionally tightens asylum guidelines by totally incorporating the EU’s “secure third nation” precept and the EU-wide listing of secure international locations, making it simpler to declare functions inadmissible or reject them at an early stage.
Returns stay a weak hyperlink
Italy stays the highest EU vacation spot for irregular migration, with round 66,300 irregular arrivals in 2025. This can be a slight lower from the earlier yr however nonetheless far beneath the report highs of 2023.
On the identical time, opposite to what’s believed, Italy registers among the many lowest numbers of asylum seekers and refugees within the EU, above solely Hungary.
In the meantime, the Meloni authorities quietly expanded authorized pathways, considerably growing its decreto flussi, the mechanism for issuing work permits to non-EU nationals.
Over 500,000 permits are deliberate over three years, with 368,000 issued between October 2022 and December 2024.
This has allowed some irregular migrants to regularise — a nuance largely absent within the political noise round migration.
This stress exposes the twin logic of Italy’s migration governance: public-facing deterrence and hardline rhetoric coexist with pragmatic measures that quietly handle flows and labour wants.
The hubs don’t work
The legislation additionally seeks to revive the so-called Albania mannequin, a long-standing flagship initiative of the Meloni authorities that later impressed the EU-level proposal for return hubs.
The Albania mannequin envisioned outsourcing reception and returns to a non-EU companion however was by no means totally operational, because it confronted authorized hurdles at each nationwide and EU ranges.
Even when carried out, it could have required an estimated €680m over 5 years for a deterrence impact near zero.
With centres providing solely round 1,200 locations, the likelihood of migrants being despatched to Albania was extraordinarily low, particularly given the 66,000 irregular arrivals recorded in 2025, and the chance of subsequent returns was even smaller.
Certainly, cooperation with third international locations stays patchy, with return charges starting from 24 p.c in Tunisia to only one p.c in Mali and Guinea.
Below the EU framework, return hubs are amenities in third international locations the place people whose asylum requests within the EU have been rejected could possibly be briefly hosted earlier than deportation.
Nonetheless, hubs can not deal with the core problem: securing significant partnerships with international locations of origin.
Measures corresponding to naval interdictions or lists of “secure” international locations don’t alter return outcomes.
A naval blockade focusing on NGO vessels, which account for less than about 12 p.c of arrivals, can not meaningfully cut back arrivals or enhance returns.
Equally, the designation of secure third international locations is essentially irrelevant if these international locations don’t settle for returnees.
Any hub, no matter its authorized or operational framework, is barely efficient if the nation internet hosting or receiving migrants is keen to cooperate, a situation seldom met.
The “naval blockade” could sound forceful, and the Albania mannequin grand, but each reveal the bounds of deterrence when cooperation with third international locations falters.
Beneath the hardline rhetoric, the federal government quietly implements pragmatic measures, corresponding to regularisation and expanded authorized pathways, to handle flows and labour wants.
Crucially, nonetheless, this pragmatism is essentially invisible to the general public: voters are uncovered primarily to the spectacle of deterrence, which generates political noise with out delivering tangible outcomes.
Even from a strictly deterrence-oriented perspective, the brand new measures are unlikely to attain their acknowledged targets. One would possibly ask whether or not the federal government’s hard-right strategy is really governing migration, or just stage-managing it.
